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The impact of insider trading on analyst coverage and forecasts 
 
Abstract: We examine the effect of insider trading on analyst coverage and on the properties 
of analyst forecasts. We find that the level of analyst coverage is positively related to the 
intensity of insider trades and that analyst coverage is more strongly associated with insider 
purchases than with insider sales. We also find that the positive association between analyst 
coverage and insider trades is less pronounced after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
Further investigations reveal that: (i) analysts revise their earnings forecasts upwards following 
insider purchases, (ii) the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions significantly increases 
following insider purchases, and (iii) optimistic bias in analyst forecast revisions is reduced as 
a result of insider purchases; we do not find similar evidence for insider sales. Our study 
contributes to understanding the role that insider trading may play in shaping analyst behaviour. 
 
Keywords: insider sales; insider purchases; analyst following; Regulation Fair Disclosure; 
analyst forecast properties  
JEL Classification: G12; G14; G24; M41; M48
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1. Introduction 
Financial analysts, either as information intermediaries or information providers, play an 
important role in financial markets; crucially, they provide forecasts of firms’ future earnings 
prospects (Marcus and Wallace, 1991). In making earnings forecasts, financial analysts rely on a 
variety of information sources, including financial statements, voluntary disclosures, and 
management-provided information. Firms’ management is known to engage in insider trades, and 
such activities may offer analysts a further potentially useful source of information for making 
forecasts. Despite this, relatively little attention has been paid to understanding the role insider trading 
may play in analyst research activities. The objective of our study is to examine whether and to what 
extent financial analysts refer to insider trading information in their decision-making processes. In 
particular, we look at the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage, and at how such impact may 
vary in response to the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter, Reg FD). We also 
examine how insider trades affect the properties of analyst earnings forecasts, including forecast 
revisions, forecast informativeness, and forecast errors. 
Insider trades refer to stock trades executed by company officers, directors, and shareholders 
who hold 10%, or more, of equity securities of a firm (SEA, 2011). Such trades are widespread and 
are required to be filed with SEC and released to the public. Empirical studies (e.g., Ke et al., 2003; 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; John and Lang, 1991; Lee et al., 1992) 
provide evidence that insider trades convey private information about future firm performance. Given 
this, insider trades should increase the amount of relevant information available to analysts, helping 
them reach more accurate and consistent forecasts at lower information gathering and/or processing 
costs. Put differently, in the absence of insider trading information, analysts may have to exert greater 
effort and incur more costs to maintain forecast accuracy; this reduces the net benefits to analysts of 
providing earnings forecasts. Moreover, to the extent that investors perceive themselves less capable 
than analysts to process insider trading information promptly and to infer its implications for future 
earnings, investors would be more reliant on analyst reports, thereby inducing more analyst following. 
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As such, we expect that the level of analyst coverage will increase with the intensity of insider trades.  
We also examine the separate effects of insider purchasing vis-à-vis insider selling on analyst 
coverage. Prior studies (Frankel and Li, 2004; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Carpenter and Remmers, 
2001; Seyhun, 1990) show that insider sales might be driven by insiders’ liquidity needs or investment 
diversification rather than by insiders’ pessimistic expectations about future firm performance; 
whereas insider purchases usually occur when insiders foresee positive prospects for their firms. On 
this basis, insider sales are relatively less informative about a firm’s future prospect than are insider 
purchases.1 Thus, we expect that, compared to insider selling, insider purchasing has a greater impact 
on analyst coverage. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of U.S. firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ. Sample period is 1995-2012. After taking steps to control for endogeneity, we find that 
analyst coverage increases with increasing intensity of insider trades. We also find that the positive 
impact of insider purchases on analyst coverage is larger than that of insider sales, suggesting that 
insider purchases are regarded by analysts as being more informative about a firm’s future prospect 
than insider sales.  
To supplement our research, we examine how the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage 
varies in response to the implementation of Reg FD. In August 2000, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Reg FD with an aim to establish a level playing field for all 
investors (SEC, 2000). Reg FD proscribes insiders from disclosing private information to analysts 
without simultaneously disclosing it to the public. If this leads to a decline in corporate disclosures 
(i.e., the situation in which insiders convert their selective disclosure strategies to fewer- or non-
                                                             
1 The underlying reasons are threefold. First, insider sales, once perceived to be informationally driven, would 
expose a firm to higher litigation risk than would informed insider purchases (e.g., Cheng and Lo, 2006). As such, 
managers might have a relatively stronger incentive to engage in informed insider purchases vis-a-vis informed 
insider sales. Second, compared to insider sales, insider purchases are less likely to be made for portfolio rebalancing 
reasons (Frankel and Li, 2004). Third, insiders would incur opportunity costs for purchasing shares of their firms 
(e.g., Cheng and Lo, 2006), and are prevented by short-swing profit rule from purchasing (selling) and selling 
(purchasing) their companies’ shares within a given six-month period. Thus, it is less likely that insider purchases 
are made based on contrarian beliefs. Rather, insiders buy shares only when they believe that their companies will 
perform well in the long term. For the above three reasons, compared with insider selling, insider purchasing is 
relatively more likely to be driven by insiders’ superior information about future firm performance.  
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disclosure strategies due to the concern of proprietary costs of disclosures), then analysts’ demand for, 
and reliance on, insider trading information would likely increase. In this context, we predict that the 
positive association between insider trading and analyst coverage is more pronounced in the post-
Reg-FD period. However, if Reg FD increases the quantity and quality of information disclosed to 
the market (i.e., the situation in which insiders actively convert their selective disclosure strategies to 
fair public disclosures), outside investors’ demand for analyst services may be reduced, and 
consequently, the benefits of providing such services will decrease. In this case, analysts have a 
weaker incentive to seek to integrate insider trading information into their research.2 We therefore 
expect that the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage is weaker in the post-Reg-FD period. 
Consistent with the second expectation, we find evidence that Reg FD weakens the positive 
association between insider trading and analyst coverage, which suggests that Reg FD improves firms’ 
information environments.  
Pre-Reg-FD, analysts are likely to have had frequent communications with insiders about their 
private information. As such, our main evidence that more frequent insider trades lead to high analyst 
coverage might be subject to an alternative explanation. This is that managers alert analysts to the 
insider trades, and explain the rationale behind such trades, via private communications, rather than 
analysts themselves referring to, and learning from, insider trades. To negate or minimize such a 
possibility, we restrict our sample period to the post-Reg-FD era, in which the communications 
between insiders and outsiders about private information are significantly more restricted (see, e.g., 
Koch et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2018). We obtain qualitatively the same results. 
We conduct three additional tests aimed at offering insight into how insider trades may affect 
analyst earnings forecasts. First, we examine the impact of insider trades on analyst forecast revisions. 
We expect that analysts would revise their forecasts in the direction of insider trades. To the extent 
                                                             
2 Integration of any value-relevant information, including insider trades, into valuation research for making trading 
decision would entail costs, which are termed integration costs. Hodge et al. (2014) and Blankespoor et al. (2019) 
define such costs as including “costs necessary to evaluate, combine, and incorporate information into valuation 
models and trading decisions”. 
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that insider purchases are more informative than insider sales, the upwards revision analysts make in 
response to insider purchases should be larger than the downwards revisions made in response to 
insider sales. Our results confirm this prediction. 
Second, we investigate the impact of insider trading on the informativeness of analyst forecast 
revisions. Following Frankel et al. (2006), we measure the informativeness of analyst forecast 
revisions by reference to stock market reactions to the forecast revisions. We find that insider 
purchases significantly increase the informativeness of analysts’ revised forecasts, whereas insider 
sales do not. This result is in line with our previous evidence that, compared to insider sales, insider 
purchases have a larger impact on analyst coverage and forecast revisions. This result also lends 
support to the view that insider purchases are more informative and help increase the value of analyst 
services to a larger degree than do insider sales.  
For the third additional test, we examine whether errors in analysts’ revised forecasts are related 
to insider trades. In line with prior research (e.g., Duru and Reeb, 2002), forecast error is measured 
based on the deviation of analyst revised forecast of EPS from actual EPS. We find that analysts’ 
revised forecasts following insider purchases are less optimistically biased. This result, combined 
with our early finding regarding analyst forecast revisions made in response to insider purchases, 
suggests that analysts appear to integrate insider purchases in an appropriate manner into their 
forecasts. Unlike the case of insider purchases that are predominantly information-driven, analysts 
might not be able to discern information-motivated sales from liquidity- or diversification- motivated 
sales, especially absent access to private corporate information post Reg FD. Consistent with this 
notion, we find no evidence that analyst revised forecasts are less pessimistically biased as a result of 
insider sales, but rather, find results, albeit marginally significant, that insider sales drive analysts’ 
revised forecasts to be pessimistically biased for the post-Reg-FD era.  
To assure that our foregoing regression results for the impact of insider trading on analyst 
coverage and forecast properties are, as far as possible, free from correlated-omitted-variables bias, 
we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) to perform the impact threshold for a confounding variable 
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(ITCV) test. We find that the absolute value of ITCV estimated for each of our regressions is higher 
than the absolute value of the impact factor for all the control variables used in the regression. This 
suggests that our results are robust to potential correlated omitted variables.  
The key contribution of our study is as follows. A large body of insider trading literature (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2009; Badertscher et al. 2011; Thevenot 2012; Skaife et al. 2013; Billings and 
Cedergren 2015; Dechow et al., 2016) provides evidence that insiders actively trade on their private 
information, such as their foreknowledge of price-relevant corporate events. This literature suggests 
that insider trades are potentially value-relevant and are informative about a firm’s future prospect. 
However, less research attention has been paid to investigating how insider trades might affect market 
participants’ (especially sophisticated participants’) behavior. Our study contributes to this line of 
literature by examining whether and how insider trades influence analyst behavior. Given the central 
role of analysts for information diffusion in stock markets, advancing understanding of the role insider 
trades may play in analyst coverage and forecasts, especially in the context of a changed legal 
environment (e.g., the implementation of Reg FD), should be a worthy goal. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to provide evidence of a positive association between insider trades 
and analyst coverage. By accounting for the post-Reg-FD regime, our paper is also the first to offer 
evidence on how analysts, in the absence of access to management’s private information due to the 
regime change by Reg FD, react to insider trades.  
Our study also contributes to the insider trading literature in the following two ways. First, 
there is an ongoing debate about the benefits and drawbacks of insider trading. Opponents of insider 
trading view insider trades as inequitable and immoral and assert that restricting insider trades reduces 
resource misallocation and benefits the whole society. Proponents contend that insider trading 
accelerates price discovery process, increases market efficiency (e.g., Leland, 1992; Bernhardt et al., 
1995; Choi et al., 2016), and may even play a role in rewarding and motivating executives (e.g., 
Roulstone, 2003; Denis and Xu, 2013). Our research documents that insider trading increases the 
amount of information valuable to analyst research activities and helps enhance analyst services.  
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Second, prior research (e.g., Frankel and Li, 2004; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Carpenter and 
Remmers, 2001) maintains that insider sales are less informative about a firm’s future prospect than 
are insider purchases, since insider sales might take place for the liquidity and diversification purposes. 
By probing the stock price responses to insider selling activities, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng et 
al. (2003), and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) infer that insider selling is not informative about future firm 
performance. However, for such an inference, we cannot rule out the possibility that insider sales do 
convey value-relevant information, but the stock market does not react correctly to such trading 
information (e.g., Beneish and Vargus, 2002). Because we focus on examining analysts’ responses to 
insider sales, and analysts are supposed to be sophisticated in information processing, our study adds 
more compelling evidence for the notion that insider sales convey less information about a firm’s 
future prospect than do insider purchases.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents our research 
design. Section 4 discusses our empirical results. Section 5 carries out the additional tests. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on data gathered primarily from I/B/E/S, CRSP, Compustat, 
Factset, and Thomson Financial. Our sample covers U.S. listed firms, as Reg FD enforced by the 
American Securities Exchange Commission provides a good setting to examine how insider trades 
shape analyst behavior. Financial analyst data are taken from I/B/E/S. In the years before 1995, 
analyst coverage is sparse, and the “estimate date” in the I/B/E/S detail file often does not accurately 
represent the release dates of analyst forecasts (Frankel et al., 2006; Clement et al., 2011). Therefore, 
our sample period is from 1995 to 2012.  
Insider trading data are obtained from Thomson Financial Insider Research Services Historical 
Files. Consistent with Huddart and Ke (2007) and Huddart et al. (2007), insider trading transactions 
used in the empirical tests are limited to open market stock purchases and open market stock sales. 
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Non-open-market transactions, such as dividend reinvestments, stock transfers among family 
members, and pension transactions, are excluded. We further restrict insider trading transactions to 
those executed by officers and directors only, excluding those executed by non-officer employees 
who are unlikely to influence major corporate decisions.3 Data on institutional holdings are obtained 
from Factset. Other data are from CRSP and Compustat. We require that firms have necessary data 
available on CRSP, Compustat, I/B/E/S, Factset, and Thomson Financial to construct the variables of 
interest. The final sample for our analysis comprises 45,195 firm-year observations for 8,923 unique 
firms.  
 
3. Research design 
We employ the following firm-fixed effects regression models to test the impact of insider 
trades on analyst coverage:4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
 + 
13
14 15
loganalyst logtrade fd tradingvol beta retvol price
size btm insti rd qtrret roa+α litigation+
α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
      
     

     
          (1) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 +
13 14 15
loganalyst lognetsale lognetbuy fd tradingvol beta
retvol price size btm insti rd qtrret roa+
α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
     
       

     
             (2) 
The dependent variable for models (1-2) is loganalyst, which equals the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of analysts making at least one earnings forecast for a given firm for a given fiscal 
year after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. 5 loganalyst equals 0 if no analyst forecasts 
                                                             
3 Our results hold if we use insider trades made by CEOs, CFOs, and chairmen of boards (namely, senior insiders) 
only.  
4 As with some prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2011), we use a firm-fixed-effects regression model to mitigate 
potential endogeneity problem. The firm-fixed-effects model is widely used in archival research to mitigate 
endogeneity problems (Wooldridge, 2000; He, 2015; Swanquist and Whited, 2018). Our results are qualitatively 
identical if we apply OLS regression model for the empirical tests.   
5 In this paper, analyst coverage and the properties of analyst forecasts are measured based on the period starting 
from the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, because analysts are reluctant to issue/revise their annual earnings 
forecasts in the first two fiscal quarters (e.g., Stickel, 1989). Accordingly, our insider trading measures are 
constructed based on the period of the first two fiscal quarters. Our results for the hypothesis tests remain 
qualitatively unchanged if we alternatively use the third (fourth) fiscal quarter as the measurement period for insider 
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earnings for a firm. logtrade in model (1) equals the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
shares traded by all the directors and officers of a given firm over the first two fiscal quarters.6 As 
with prior research (e.g., Cheng et al., 2013), we use two treatment variables, lognetbuy and 
lognetsale, in model (2) to separate insider sales from insider purchases. lognetbuy is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the volume amount of net insider purchases (i.e., insider purchases minus 
insider sales) made by the directors and officers of a given firm over the first two fiscal quarters, if 
that firm has a positive volume amount of net insider purchases, and equals 0 if the firm has a 
negative/zero volume amount of net insider purchases. lognetsale equals the natural logarithm of one 
plus the volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider sales minus insider purchases) made by the 
directors and officers of a firm over the first two fiscal quarters, if the firm has a positive volume 
amount of net insider sales, and equals 0 if the firm has a non-positive volume amount of net insider 
sales. 7  logtrade, lognetbuy, and lognetsale are all constructed based on daily trading data; we 
aggregate daily inside trades to obtain overall trading volume over the first two fiscal quarters. 
Following prior research on the determinants of analyst coverage (e.g., Hayes, 1998; Mohanram 
and Sunder, 2006; He et al., 2019a, b), we include the following control variables in our regression 
models: research and development expenditures (rd), book-to-market ratio (btm), size (size), firm beta 
(beta), stock return variance (retvol), stock price (price), stock returns (qtrret), trading volume 
(tradingvol), institutional stock ownership (insti), return on assets (roa), litigation risk (litigation), 
and an indicator variable for the post-Reg-FD period (fd). All control variables are defined in the 
Appendix.   
To test how Reg FD moderates the association between insider trading and analyst coverage, we 
                                                             
trades (analyst coverage/forecast properties). Our results are also amenable to estimating analyst coverage to be 
one-year lagged by insider trades. 
6 Insiders would bear legal and reputational risks for trading on private information. Therefore, insiders might opt 
to reduce detection risk, and associated reputational losses and threat of litigation for informed insider trades, by 
making routine trades in place of non-routine trades. As such, routine insider trades might still be informative. 
Therefore, we do not separate routine insider trades from non-routine insider trades in our main analysis. Our results 
still hold for restricting the measures of insider trades to non-routine trades only.  
7 All our results remain qualitatively unchanged if the dollar value of shares traded by insiders is used to define 
logtrade, lognetbuy, and lognetsale. 
11 
 
augment model (2) with two interaction terms, fd*lognetsale and fd* lognetbuy, and derive the 
following regression model:  
6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 4
5 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18
loganalyst = α +α fd * lognetsale+α fd * lognetbuy+α lognetsale+α lognetbuy
+α fd +α tradingvol +α beta+α retvol +α price+α size+α btm+α insti+α rd
+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
  (3) 
fd*lognetsale and fd*lognetbuy reflect the incremental impact of insider trading on analyst 
coverage in the post-Reg-FD period relative to the pre-Reg-FD period.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Univariate results 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our hypothesis tests. Since the 
number of analysts following a firm is highly skewed, and given that it is possible that a firm is not 
covered by any analyst, we use the logarithm transformation of one plus the number of analyst 
following for our empirical analysis. The mean of loganalyst is 2.0641. This signifies that, on average, 
each firm is followed by approximately 7 analysts over the last two fiscal quarters of a year. We 
logarithmically transform the insider trading variables because insider trading data also tend to be 
highly skewed. The mean of lognetsale (4.3947) is larger than that of lognetbuy (1.4186), suggesting 
that insider trades are predominantly sales-based over the first two fiscal quarters of a year. Our un-
tabulated results reveal that the Spearman correlation between lognetsell and lognetbuy is -0.3286, 
indicating no multicollinearity issue arising should both lognetsale and lognetbuy be included in the 
same regression. In addition, our results for variance inflation factors (VIF) tests reveal that none of 
our continuous independent variables has a VIF value higher than 5, indicating no multicollinearity 
issue for our regression analysis.  
4.2 Multivariate results 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage. 
Columns (1-2) reports the firm-fixed-effects regression results for the whole sample period of 1995-
2012; Columns (3-4) reports the firm-fixed-effects regression results for the post-Reg-FD period (i.e., 
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2001-2012) only.8 For both sets of results, we find significantly positive coefficients on logtrade, 
indicating that insider trades increase analyst coverage. 9  A one-standard-deviation increase in 
logtrade for the period of 1995-2012 (2001-2012) is associated with an increase in loganalyst by 
0.1018 (0.1208), which is equivalent to around 5% (6%) of the sample mean of loganalyst and is 
economically significant. While both lognetbuy and lognetsale show positive coefficients that are 
also statistically and economically significant, the coefficient for lognetbuy is significantly larger in 
magnitude than that for lognetsale (F-stat.=50.64 (21.26)). This suggests that the association between 
insider purchases and analyst coverage is stronger than that between insider sales and analyst 
coverage.  
Table 3 reports regression results for model (3). The coefficient on fd*lognetbuy is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the impact of insider trading on analyst 
coverage becomes weaker after Reg FD. We interpret this as evidence supporting the notion that Reg 
FD improves firms’ information environments, because the improved information environment can 
reduce investor demand for analyst services and thus dis-incentivize analysts from exerting effort to 
integrate insider trading information into their research and forecasts. Hence, it can be inferred that 
the regulatory prohibition of selective disclosures results in potentially fairer disclosures, rather than 
in fewer disclosures.  
                                                             
8  The communication of private information between firm management and analysts is unlikely to be fully 
prevented by Reg FD. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suggest that given potential legal and/or reputational penalties 
for non-compliance with Reg FD, private information communications between analysts and insiders would be 
limited, as suggested in a large body of the Reg FD literature (e.g., Koch et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2017; Hu et al., 
2018). This is also evident in the dearth of legal cases regarding breaches of Reg FD, and is in line with the prior 
view that managers tend to be careful and ‘correct’ in what they say to analysts, especially when the litigation risks 
associated with private communications are significantly heightened post Reg FD (Koch et al., 2013). Hence, in 
accounting for the post-Reg-FD period, we reduce the endogeneity concern that insider trading and analyst coverage 
are simultaneously determined by factors relating to private information. 
9 One may argue that insiders’ plausible anticipation of future analyst coverage may curb their incentives to engage 
in insider trades, thereby raising the possibility of reverse causality. However, it is questionable that corporate 
insiders are able to anticipate the number of future analyst followings. Even if insiders were able to do so, the impact 
that the insiders’ anticipation of future analyst coverage has on insider trades is negative, which is unlikely to explain 
the positive association between insider trading and analyst coverage. Therefore, reverse causality is unlikely to be 
an issue in our study. Furthermore, as private-information communications between insiders and analysts are 
disallowed by Reg FD, insiders’ ability to anticipate future analyst coverage would be constrained as a result of lack 
of private information. By restricting our sample period to the post Reg FD period, the reverse causality possibility 
is minimized.  
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5. Additional tests 
5.1 The impact of insider trading on analyst forecast revisions 
     Given our evidence of the positive link between insider trading and analyst coverage, we further 
look at whether and how insider trades influence analyst forecast revisions. If insider trades convey 
information about future firm performance, analysts should revise their earnings forecasts in the 
direction of insider trades. Given that insider purchases are more informative about a firm’s future 
prospect than insider sales, insider purchases should have a larger impact on analyst forecast revisions 
than insider sales. To test this prediction, we use the following firm-fixed-effects regression model: 
9 10
+
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 11 12
13 14 15 16
 forecast = α +α lognetsale +α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol
+α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise+α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret
+α roa α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
     (4) 
The analyst forecast revision variable, forecast, is defined as analysts’ first earnings forecast 
issued for a firm for a fiscal year after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, minus the median 
consensus analyst annual earnings forecast for the first two fiscal quarters; this is divided by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. We control for analyst forecast horizon (horizon), return 
volatility (retvol), firm size (size), book-to-market ratio (btm), R&D expenditures (rd), expected 
earnings news (anasurprise), institutional ownership (insti), return on assets (roa), litigation risk 
(litigation), abnormal trading volume (abtradvol), and abnormal stock returns (qtrret). All these 
variables are defined in the Appendix, and are identified by prior literature as influencing analyst 
forecast revisions in at least some circumstances (e.g., Kross and Suk, 2012; Clement et al., 2011; 
Hahn and Song, 2013; Sivakumar and Vijayakumar, 2001). The inclusion of abtradvol and qtrret 
controls for the impact of potential fundamental-related events that might drive both insider trades 
and analyst forecast revisions.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficients for lognetbuy in Columns (1) 
and (2) are both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that analysts tend to revise their 
earnings forecasts upwards following insider purchases. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
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lognetbuy is associated with an increase in forecast by 0.0052 (0.0410) for the whole sample (post-
Reg-FD) period, which accounts for 27% (39%) of the sample mean of forecast and is economically 
significant. The coefficients on lognetsale, albeit negative, are not statistically significant at the 
conventional 5% level. Hence, there is no significant impact of insider sales on analyst forecast 
revisions. This is because insider selling might occur for non-informational reasons such as liquidity 
needs and portfolio diversifications and is thus less informative about firm prospects.  
 
5.2 The effect of insider trades on the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions 
Since insider trades impact analyst forecast revisions, we further investigate how insider trading 
affects the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions. If insider trades convey value-relevant 
corporate information (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Veenman, 2012; He et 
al., 2019a, b), analysts’ incorporation of insider trading information into their earnings forecast 
revisions should make the revised forecasts more informative. If insider purchases are indeed more 
informative than insider sales, analyst forecast revisions made in response to insider purchases should 
be more informative than that made in response to insider sales. To test this, we use the following 
firm-fixed-effects regression model:  
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17
+car = α +α lognetsale+α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α forecast α tradingvol
+α beta+α retvol +α price+α size+α btm+α insti+α rd +α qtrret 
+α roa +α litigation +α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
        (5) 
The dependent variable, car, is the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative abnormal stock returns around 
analysts’ first earnings forecast issued for a firm for a fiscal year after the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter. Abnormal stock returns are calculated using a market model with an estimation period of [-
181, -2] relative to the forecast date. We control for the magnitude of analyst forecast revisions 
(forecast) which likely affect car. We further control for trading volume (tradingvol), firm beta (beta), 
return volatility (retvol), stock price (price), firm size (size), litigation risk (litigation), book-to-market 
ratio (btm), return on assets (roa), institutional ownership (insti), R&D expenditures (rd), and 
abnormal stock returns (qtrret). Extant research finds that these variables are associated with the 
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informativeness of analyst earnings forecasts.  
Table 5 reports the regression results. lognetbuy in Columns (1) and (2) has a positive, 
statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that insider purchases significantly increase the 
informativeness of analysts’ revised forecasts. The coefficients for lognetsale, however, are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that insider sales do not render analyst forecast revisions more 
informative. The results for model (5) reconcile with our early evidence that insider purchases have 
a greater impact on analyst coverage and forecast revisions than insider sales. The results also support 
the notion that insider purchases are more informative and help increase the value of analyst services 
to a larger degree, compared with insider sales. More importantly, because as in Frankel et al. (2006), 
the analyst earnings forecast informativeness is measured by stock market reactions to the analyst 
forecasts, our results support our earlier view that insider trades increase investor demand for analyst 
forecasts.  
 
5.3 The impact of insider trading on the errors in analyst revised earnings forecasts 
Given the impact of insider trades on analyst forecast revisions, we examine whether analysts’ 
revised forecasts would be less biased as a result of insider trades. We employ the following two firm-
fixed-effects regression models:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
optimism = α +α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol +α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise+
α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
(6) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
pessimism = α +α lognetsale(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol +α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise+
α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
(7) 
optimism (pessimism) in model (6) ((7)) measures the degree of optimistic (pessimistic) error in 
an analyst forecast revision. optimism equals analysts’ first earnings forecast issued for a firm for a 
fiscal year at the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, minus actual earnings, divided by the stock 
price at the end of the fiscal year; optimism equals 0 if actual earnings are higher than the analysts’ 
first earnings forecast. pessimism equals actual earnings minus analysts’ first earnings forecast that is 
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issued for a firm for a fiscal year at the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, divided by the stock price 
at the end of the fiscal year; pessimism equals 0 if actual earnings are lower than the analysts’ first 
earnings forecast. We maintain the same control variables as per model (5). These control variables, 
as documented in prior literature (e.g., Lim, 2001; Huberts and Fuller, 1995; Das et al., 1998; He et 
al., 2019a, b), may affect analyst forecast errors.  
Table 6 reports the regression results. The coefficients on lognetbuy, reported in Columns (1) 
and (3), are negative and statistically significant, indicating that analysts’ revised forecasts following 
insider purchases are less optimistically biased. This result, in conjunction with our early findings, 
suggests that analysts appear to incorporate appropriately the insider purchasing information into their 
forecasts. The lognetsale in Column (2), which reveals the impact of insider sales on analyst forecast 
pessimism for the period of 1995-2012, does not take on a statistically significant coefficient. These 
asymmetric results for insider purchases vis-à-vis insider sales are consistent with the notion that the 
former is substantively more informative about future firm prospect than the latter. Noticeably, the 
coefficient on lognetsale for the post-Reg-FD period, shown in Column (4), is even marginally 
significant at the 10% level; this could be taken as weak evidence suggesting that insider sales lead 
analysts to make pessimistically biased forecasts post Reg FD. Insider sales could be driven by 
insiders’ liquidity needs or for portfolio diversification purposes; given this, absent access to private 
corporate information in the post-Reg-FD era, analysts might misinterpret all insider sales (including 
uninformed sales) as signaling insiders’ pessimistic views on firm prospects and thus issue pessimistic 
forecasts. This helps explain the result in Column (4).  
 
5.4 Impact threshold for a confounding variable in the regression analysis 
To check that our regression results are not driven by correlated omitted variables, we follow 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and carry out an analysis of the impact threshold for a confounding 
variable (ITCV) for our previous multivariate tests. ITCV refers to the threshold of an omitted, 
confounding variable’s impact beyond which our results and inferences would be overturned if such 
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a confounding variable were controlled in the regression model (Frank, 2000). Should the value of 
ITCV be larger, our regression results would have been less susceptible to potential omitted-variables 
bias.  
We first conduct the ITCV test for our previous regressions, in which we find statistically 
significant results for the main variables of interest, and that are run for our whole sample period of 
1995-2012. Our results (not tabulated) reveal that each estimated ITCV value is higher than the 
absolute value of the impact factor for all the control variables used in the associated model. The 
result provides assurance that our significant results for the impact of insider trades on analyst 
coverage and forecast properties are robust to potential correlated omitted variables. For the 
regressions run for the post-Reg-FD period only, we repeat our ITCV analysis, and are again able to 
conclude that our significant results for the main variables of interest are insensitive to potential 
omitted-variables bias. Finally, we repeat our ITCV evaluation procedure for our statistically 
insignificant results for lognetsale. The same conclusion arises.  
 
6. Conclusion  
We examine whether and to what extent the information inherent in insider trades affects analyst 
behavior. We find evidence that the number of analysts following a given firm is positively correlated 
with the intensity of insider trades, and that analyst coverage is more strongly associated with insider 
purchases than with insider sales. We also find that the positive association between analyst coverage 
and insider trades is weaker after the passage of Reg FD. In offering insights into how insider trades 
affect analyst forecasts, we further provide evidence on the following: (i) that analysts revise their 
earnings forecasts upwards and significantly following insider purchases, (ii) that the informativeness 
of analysts’ revised forecasts significantly increases following insider purchases, and (iii) optimistic 
bias in analyst forecast revisions is reduced as a result of insider purchases. However, we do not find 
similar evidence for insider selling. This is likely due to its less informativeness compared with insider 
18 
 
purchases. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the role played by insider trades in 
financial analysts’ decisions.  
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Table 1  Summary statistics 
 
Variables   N Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. 
analyst 45195 7 1 9 25 3.3614 
loganalyst 45195 2.0641 0.6931 2.3026 3.2581 1.4728 
trade 45195 22.2871 0 0 38998.34 1515.11 
logtrade 45195 3.1479 0 0 10.5713 7.3239 
netsale 45195 80.0203 0 0 59873.14 272.99 
lognetsale 45195 4.3947 0 0 11.00 5.6131 
netbuy 45195 3.1313 0 0 0 29.7749 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the hypothesis tests. The sample consists of 45,195 
firm-year observations, inclusive of those with or without analyst coverage over the period of 1995-2012. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
lognetbuy 45195 1.4186 0 0 0 3.4267 
fd 45195 0.6783 0 1 1 0.4671 
tradingvol 45195 25.5347 0.2493 2.1020 12.4533 122.6161 
beta 45195 0.8552 0.3850 0.8004 1.2450 0.6192 
retvol 45195 0.0309 0.0170 0.0247 0.0373 0.0218 
price 45195 41.0152 7.95 18.00 31.90 1224.934 
size 45195 6.1045 4.66 6.15 7.49 2.0923 
btm 45195 0.8941 0.4000 0.5757 0.9204 5.0332 
insti 45195 0.4391 0.0796 0.4282 0.7433 0.3531 
rd 45195 0.0751 0 0 0 0.2635 
qtrret 45195 0.0187 -0.1739 -0.0222 0.1415 0.4269 
roa 45195 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0242 0.0633 1.3899 
litigation 45195 0.1712 0 0 0 0.3767 
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Table 2  Multivariate tests of the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
 + 
13 14 15
loganalyst logtrade fd tradingvol beta retvol price size btm
insti rd qtrret roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
        
    
        
  
 
  (1) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13
 +
13 14 15
loganalyst lognetsale lognetbuy fd tradingvol beta retvol price size
btm insti rd qtrret roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
        
     
        
   
(2) 
 
Variables    Sample period (1995-2012)     Sample period (2001-2012) 
Equation (1) VIF Equation (2) VIF Equation (1) VIF Equation (2) VIF 
logtrade 0.0139 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.22   0.0165 
(<0.001)*** 
1.23   
lognetsale   0.0686 
(<0.001)*** 
1.67   0.0655 
(<0.001)*** 
1.68 
lognetbuy   0.0778 
(<0.001)*** 
1.20   0.0699 
(<0.001)*** 
1.22 
fd -1.2535 
 (<0.001)*** 
17.15 -1.2322 
(<0.001)*** 
17.15     
tradingvol 0.00006 
 (0.096)* 
1.20 0.00002 
(0.470) 
1.20 0.0003 
(<0.001)*** 
1.24 0.0002 
(<0.001)*** 
1.24 
beta 0.3813 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.65 0.3225 
(<0.001)*** 
1.66 0.4142 
(<0.001)*** 
1.54 0.3500 
(<0.001)*** 
1.56 
retvol 2.9989 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.94 3.0254 
(<0.001)*** 
1.94 -2.2508 
(<0.001)*** 
2.05 -2.1289 
(<0.001)*** 
2.05 
price -0.00005 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.00005 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.00004 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.00004 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 
size 0.4106 
(<0.001)*** 
2.19 0.3783 
(<0.001)*** 
2.24 0.3500 
(<0.001)*** 
2.33 0.3194 
(<0.001)*** 
2.38 
btm 0.0038 
(<0.001)*** 
1.02 0.0041 
(<0.001)*** 
1.02 0.0006 
(0.803) 
1.06 0.0021 
(0.362) 
1.06 
insti 0.7074 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.52 0.4098 
(<0.001)*** 
1.63 0.6964 
(<0.001)*** 
1.53 0.4619 
(<0.001)*** 
1.61 
rd -0.0986 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.07 -0.0729 
(<0.001)*** 
1.07 -0.1089 
(<0.001 )*** 
1.04 -0.0481 
(0.061)* 
1.04 
qtrret -0.1784 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.05 -0.1797 
(<0.001)*** 
1.05 -0.1135 
(<0.001)*** 
1.04 -0.1167 
(<0.001)*** 
1.04 
roa -0.0177 
 (<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.0152 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.0180 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 -0.0156 
(<0.001)*** 
1.01 
litigation 0.2573 
(<0.001)*** 
1.05 0.2356 
(<0.001)*** 
1.05 0.2618 
(<0.001)*** 
1.04 0.2438 
(<0.001)*** 
1.04 
     
F-stat.: (lognetsale<lognetbuy) 32.72 
(<0.001)*** 
 21.18 
(<0.001)*** 
R2 0.6051 0.6512 0.6146 0.6535 
Observation
s 
45195 45195 30658 30658 
Notes: Table 3 reports regression results for the tests of the impact of insider trading on analyst coverage. The sample 
period ranges from 1995 to 2012. Both firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. VIF refers to variance inflation factors for the regression covariates. p-values 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3  Multivariate test of the moderating effect of Reg FD on the association between 
insider trading and analyst coverage 
 
6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 4
5 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18
loganalyst = α +α fd * lognetsale+α fd * lognetbuy+α lognetsale+α lognetbuy
+α fd +α tradingvol +α beta+α retvol +α price+α size+α btm+α insti+α rd
+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
        
  
Variables Sample period (1995-2012) 
fd*lognetsale -0.0024 
(0.164) 
fd*lognetbuy -0.0113 
(<0.001)*** 
Lognetsale 0.0701 
(<0.001)*** 
Lognetbuy 0.0864 
(<0.001)*** 
Fd -1.2213 
(<0.001)*** 
Tradingvol 0.00002 
(0.578) 
Beta 0.3133 
(<0.001)*** 
Retvol 3.0389 
(<0.001)*** 
Price -0.00005 
(<0.001)*** 
Size 0.3781 
(<0.001)*** 
Btm 0.0041 
(<0.001)*** 
Insti 0.4092 
(<0.001)*** 
rd -0.0738 
(<0.001)*** 
Qtrret -0.1798 
(<0.001)*** 
Roa -0.0153 
(<0.001)*** 
litigation 
 
0.2355 
(<0.001)*** 
  
R2 0.6513 
Observations 45195 
Notes: Table 4 reports regression results for the test of the moderating effect of Reg FD on the association between 
insider trading and analyst coverage. The sample period ranges from 1995 to 2012. Both firm-fixed effects and year-
fixed effects are included in the regressions. All variables are defined in the Appendix. p-values are in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 4 Additional test: the impact of insider trading on analyst forecast revisions 
 
 
Table 5 Additional test: the impact of insider trading on the informativeness of analyst 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev 
forecast 27698 -0.0194 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.4207 
lognetsale 27698 6.1415 0 8.42 11.6 5.8269 
lognetbuy 27698 1.6895 0 0 0 3.6924 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
9
10 +
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
11 12 13 14 15 16
 forecast = α +α lognetsale +α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol +α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise
+α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret +α roa α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
 
  
Variables Sample period (1995-2012) Sample period (2001-2012) 
lognetsale -0.0003 
(0.646) 
-0.0013 
(0.065)* 
lognetbuy 0.0031 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0023 
(0.029)** 
fd 0.0145 
(0.855) 
 
horizon -0.0124 
(-0.86) 
-0.0492 
(0.029)** 
retvol -1.6120 
(<0.001)*** 
-1.4715 
(<0.001)*** 
size 0.0075 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0100 
(<0.001)*** 
btm -0.0157 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0183 
(<0.001)*** 
rd -0.0117 
(0.214) 
-0.0101 
(0.535) 
anasurprise -8.59E-7 
(0.045)** 
-8.53E-7 
(0.068)* 
abtradvol 2.59E-6 
(0.966) 
3.42E-7 
(0.996) 
insti 0.0437 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0561 
(<0.001)*** 
qtrret 0.0771 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0898 
(<0.001)*** 
roa 0.0083 
(0.133) 
0.0332 
(<0.001)*** 
litigation 
 
0.0159 
(0.012)** 
0.0244 
(0.002)*** 
   
R2     0.0160     0.0172 
Observations     27218     19707 
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for the key variables used for the multivariate tests of the impact of insider 
trading on analyst forecast revisions. The sample is confined to firm-year observations that have analyst forecast 
revisions after the end of the second fiscal quarter over the period of 1995-2012. Panel B reports the regression results. 
Both firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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forecast revisions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev 
Car 31892 -0.0009 -0.0260 -0.0001 0.0263 0.0662 
Lognetsale 31892 5.9759 0 8.0067 11.4761 5.7845 
Lognetbuy 31892 1.8389 0 0 0 3.7992 
 
Panel B: Regression results  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
+car = α +α lognetsale+α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α forecast α tradingvol +α beta+α retvol +α price+α size+
α btm+α insti+α rd +α qtrret +α roa +α litigation +α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
 
  
Variables Sample period (1995-2012) Sample period (2001-2012) 
Lognetsale -0.00005 
(0.560) 
0.00007 
(0.472) 
Lognetbuy 0.0003 
(0.012)** 
0.0003 
(0.026)** 
Forecast 0.0050 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0048 
(<0.001)*** 
Fd -0.0240 
(<0.001)*** 
 
Fc  -0.0279 
(<0.001)*** 
Tradingvol -0.00001 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.00001 
(<0.001)*** 
Beta -0.0052 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0047 
(<0.001)*** 
Retvol 0.1818 
(<0.001)*** 
0.2769 
(<0.001)*** 
Price -0.00003 
(0.031)** 
-0.00001 
(0.460) 
Size 0.0036 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0040 
(<0.001)*** 
Btm -0.0013 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0011 
(0.003)*** 
Insti -0.0015 
(0.229) 
-0.0024 
(0.121) 
Rd -0.0006 
(0.662) 
-0.0023 
(0.332) 
Qtrret 0.0067 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0060 
(<0.001)*** 
Roa 0.0041 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0039 
(<0.001)*** 
litigation 
 
-0.0002 
(0.849) 
-0.0007 
(0.530) 
  
R2 0.0131 0.0132 
Observations 31892 22705 
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for the key variables used for the multivariate tests of the impact of insider 
trading on the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions. The sample is confined to firm-year observations that have 
analyst forecast revisions after the end of the second fiscal quarter over the period of 1995-2012. Panel B reports the 
regression results. Both firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table 6  Additional test: the impact of insider trading on the errors in analyst revised forecasts  
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                   Appendix  Summary of variable definitions 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev 
Optimism 27052 0.0585 0 0 0.0099 0.7607 
Pessimism 27218 0.0145 0 0 0.0038 0.2155 
Lognetbuy 27052 1.6824 0 0 0 3.6830 
Lognetsale 27218 6.1447 0 8.4412 11.6083 5.8239 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
optimism = α +α lognetbuy(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol +α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise+
α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
 (1) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
pessimism = α +α lognetsale(+α fd)+α horizon+α retvol +α size+α btm+α rd +α anasurprise+
α abtradvol +α insti+α qtrret +α roa+α litigation+α year - fixed effects+α firm - fixed effects+
  (2) 
 
 Sample period (1995-2012) Sample period (2001-2012) 
Variables Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (1) Equation (2) 
lognetsale  0.0004 
(0.102) 
 0.0005 
(0.063)* 
lognetbuy -0.0025 
(0.044)** 
 -0.0033 
(0.032)** 
 
fd -0.5377 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.1319 
(0.001)*** 
  
horizon 0.1087 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0332 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0980 
(0.007)*** 
0.0293 
 (0.002)*** 
retvol 3.7212 
(<0.001)*** 
0.8572 
(<0.001)*** 
3.6466 
(<0.001)*** 
1.0954 
  (<0.001)*** 
size -0.0151 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0052 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0128 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0039 
  (<0.001)*** 
btm 0.0898 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0026 
(0.016)** 
0.0985 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0025 
(0.041)** 
rd 0.0278 
(0.092)* 
0.0041 
(0.386) 
0.0176 
(0.68) 
0.0017 
(0.804) 
anasurprise -8.88E-7 
(0.238) 
2.30E-6 
(<0.001)*** 
-7.33E-7 
(0.367) 
2.29E-6 
(<0.001)*** 
abtradvol 2.40E-5 
(0.823) 
1.35E-5 
(0.662) 
1.02E-6 
(0.993) 
1.07E-5 
(0.719) 
insti -0.0759 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0355 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0881 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0411 
  (<0.001)*** 
qtrret -0.1171 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0337 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.1107 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0334 
  (<0.001)*** 
roa -0.1585 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0231 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0665 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0149 
  (<0.001)*** 
litigation -0.0343 
(0.002)*** 
0.0091 
(0.005)*** 
-0.0286 
(0.024)** 
0.0109 
 (0.001)*** 
     
R2 0.0591 0.0267 0.0517 0.0344 
Observations 27052 27218 19152 19306 
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for the key variables used for the multivariate tests of the impact of insider 
trading on the errors in analyst forecast revisions. The sample is confined to firm-year observations that have analyst 
forecast revisions after the end of the second fiscal quarter over the period of 1995-2012. Panel B reports the regression 
results. Both firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Variables Definitions 
loganalyst The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts that make at least one earnings forecast for 
a fiscal year after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. 
forecast Analysts’ first earnings forecast issued for the current fiscal year at the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter, minus consensus analyst annual earnings forecast over the first two fiscal quarters, divided 
by stock price at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
car Three-day [-1, 1] cumulative abnormal stock returns around analysts’ first earnings forecast issued 
for the current fiscal year after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. The abnormal stock returns 
are calculated using market model with an estimation period of [-181, -2] relative to the forecast 
date. 
optimism Analysts’ first forecast of EPS, issued for the current fiscal year at the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter, minus a firm’s actual EPS, divided by stock price of a firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
optimism equals 0 if a firm’s EPS is higher than the analyst’ first forecast of EPS.  
pessimism A firm’s actual EPS minus analysts’ first forecast of EPS, issued for the current fiscal year after the 
beginning of the third fiscal quarter, divided by stock price of a firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
pessimism equals 0 if a firm’s EPS is lower than the analyst’ first forecast of EPS. 
logtrade The natural logarithm of 1 plus the volume amount of insider trades made by all the directors and 
officers over the first two fiscal quarters. 
lognetsale The natural logarithm of 1 plus volume amount of net insider sales (i.e., insider sales minus insider 
purchases) made by all the directors and officers over the first two fiscal quarters, if a firm has a 
positive volume amount of net insider sales made by all the directors and officers over the first two 
fiscal quarters. lognetsale equals 0 if a firm has a negative/zero volume amount of net insider sales 
made by directors and officers over the first two fiscal quarters. 
lognetbuy The natural logarithm of 1 plus volume amount of net insider purchases (i.e., insider purchases 
minus insider sales) made by all the directors and officers over the first two fiscal quarters, if a firm 
has a positive volume amount of net insider purchases made by all the directors and officers over 
the first two fiscal quarters. lognetbuy equals 0 if a firm has a negative/zero volume amount of net 
insider purchases made by directors and officers over the first two fiscal quarters.  
retvol The standard deviation of daily market excess return over a 6-month period ending at the end of 
the second fiscal quarter.  
qtrret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a firm for the first two fiscal quarters. 
horizon The natural log of the number of days between analyst earnings forecast date and a firm’s earnings 
announcement date. 
tradingvol The average of dollar trading volume (i.e., the product of the closing price and the number of shares 
traded for a firm) for a firm at the first two fiscal quarters of the current year. 
abtravol Abnormal trading volume for a firm at the first two fiscal quarters in the current year, which is 
defined as the average of dollar trading volume (i.e., the product of the closing price and the number 
of shares traded for a firm) over the first two fiscal quarters of the current year, minus the average 
of dollar trading volume over the last two fiscal quarters of the previous year. 
anasurprise Earnings surprise, which is defined as actual EPS minus consensus median analyst forecast of EPS 
for the first two fiscal quarters.  
btm Book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity at the beginning of a fiscal 
year. 
price Stock price of a firm at the end of the second fiscal quarter.  
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
rd 1 if research and development expense of a firm at the end of the fiscal year is positive for a fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise.  
insti Institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of the outstanding shares for a firm at the 
beginning of the second fiscal quarter.  
fd 1 for post-Reg-FD period (i.e., years of 2001-2012), and 0 for pre-Reg-FD period (i.e., years of 
1995-2000). 
beta Equity beta for a firm for a fiscal year. 
roa Income before extraordinary items, divided by total assets, of a firm at the end of a fiscal year.  
litigation 1 if a firm is in the biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-3577 and 7370-
7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961) industries; and 0 otherwise. 
